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COMMENT
PETERSON v. MINIDOKA COUNTY SCHOOL: HOME
EDUCATION, FREE EXERCISE, AND
PARENTAL RIGHTS
Michael E. Chaplin*
On July 8, 1997 the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Cir-
cuit, decided Peterson v. Minidoka County School District No. 331.1 The
opinion, written by Circuit Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., expressed the
court's view on two important issues. The first issue is the free exer-
cise of religion as it relates to a parent's choice to home school her
children. Second, the court considered Fourteenth Amendment con-
cerns and the right to due process in employment. The goal of this
comment is to examine the Peterson opinion for what it adds to the
first issue; more precisely, to give specific attention to the Peterson case
in light of what it adds to the growing debate on home schooling.2
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2000; BA., University of
Washington, 1978. I would like to thank my wife, Kressen Chaplin, and my five
children, Philip, Christopher, Daniel, Sara, and Kyle for their constant love and living
example of home education in action. Finally, I would like to thank my parents,
Kenneth and Hazel Chaplin, for their unconditional support.
1 118 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1997).
2 As a recent analyst noted,
It will probably not come as a surprise to learn that homeschooling elicits
much criticism and misunderstanding. Sometimes the critics are family
members or neighbors. Large lobbying groups, such as the National School
Boards Association and the National Education Association, have also made
statements that suggest that homeschoolers are poorly supervised. In the
summer of 1997, at the annual National Education Association convention,
an anti-homeschooling resolution was adopted by the representative assem-
bly. Resolution B-63 stated that homeschooling programs "cannot provide
the student with a comprehensive education experience." Further, the reso-
lution noted that, if homeschooling is chosen "instruction should be by per-
sons who are licensed by the appropriate state education licensure agency."
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In Peterson, Frank Peterson, a former principal of Paul Elemen-
tary School in Idaho, sued the Minidoka School District (District)
claiming the District violated his First Amendment rights. The facts of
the case were not in dispute. In January 1992, Peterson informed one
of the District's assistant superintendents that he was considering
home schooling for his children. At the next school board meeting,
held in February 1992, Peterson's decision was discussed. Superinten-
dent Michael Bishop and the board decided "to delay [their] actual
rehiring until [they] could further investigate what [Peterson's] inten-
tions were."3
After that meeting, rumors spread that Peterson was planning to
home school his children. Parents and teachers began to complain,
and because of these complaints the Superintendent's office inferred
that Peterson's decision would result in a loss of confidence in his
leadership. Superintendent Bishop met with Peterson to discuss the
situation. Bishop learned that Peterson's desire to home school his
children was motivated purely for the "reason to educate his kids with
an aspect of God being the creator in all of the classes that [he and his
wife] would teach."' 4 However, Bishop was convinced that Peterson
could not perform his job as principal and at the same time ade-
quately home school his children.
In addition to the Superintendent's conviction that Peterson's de-
cision to home school his children would result in leadership
problems, Bishop also expressed two further concerns. Bishop be-
lieved, based on his experiences as a principal, that Peterson could
not adequately perform his job as a principal, a job that required
some evening work, and at the same time properly home school his
children. Bishop also expressed reservations about the ability of Pe-
terson's spouse to home school, unaided, eight children.
Officially, however, the Superintendent's office only pressed (at
least as far as the lawsuit was concerned) the first two issues. In fact,
the District strongly argued that the state's compelling interest5 in ed-
ucation required effective principals-principals who would comport
themselves in such a way that others would maintain confidence in
their leadership. The Ninth Circuit found neither of these concerns
very compelling. As for the District's concern that Peterson could not
effectively perform his job as principal and still properly home school
Isabel Lyman, Homeschooling: Back to the Future?, POL'YANALYsIs, Jan. 7, 1998, at 8 (cita-
dons omitted).
3 Peterson, 118 F.3d at 1354.
4 Id. at 1355.
5 See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
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his children, the court noted that the District had the authority to
inspect and approve any home school curriculum.
Regarding the District's complaint that Peterson's decision would
reduce his effectiveness as a leader, the Ninth Circuit noted-rather
acerbically-that any "concern for loss of confidence in [Peterson's]
leadership, [required] the District ... to take account of the fact that
[Peterson] was exercising a constitutional right and that accommoda-
tion of uninformed and prejudiced persons was not a compelling state
interest outweighing that exercise."6
It is interesting to note that Idaho law provides for home educa-
tion as a legitimate alternative. The State's only legitimate concern is
ensuring that children are "instructed in subjects commonly and usu-
ally taught in the public schools of the state of Idaho."7 So why did
the District make such a fuss about Peterson's decision to home
school his children? What was it about Peterson that caused him to be
singled out, especially when the law of the land permitted him to do
what he wanted-home school his children?8 Although the Ninth
6 Peterson, 118 F.3d at 1357.
7 IDAHO CODE § 332-02 (1995).
8 There are at least two answers to this question. Perhaps the School District
simply had more leverage with Peterson than with other parents in the District. This
answer seems especially plausible in light of the concerns Bishop expressed about
Mrs. Peterson's ability. Nothing in Idaho law required a home-schooling parent to
possess any particular degree, training, or certification. And of course manyjobs, like
Frank Peterson's, require parents to work evenings, yet they still manage to take an
active role in the home education of their children. The other potential answer is
that home schooling is not able to meet a children's academic or social needs. Critics
are quick to note that home schooling does not provide the type of social interaction
available to children in private or public school. The implication being that the kind
of socialization children receive in a more formal setting is somehow better than what
they receive at home. In addition, home school opponents challenge the level of
academic achievement of home schooled children. However, while there are un-
doubtedly anecdotal instances that bolster this belief, the facts tell a different story.
As one commentator observed,
Several state departments of education have also done studies on the aca-
demic progress of home schooled children. In the spring of 1986, the Ten-
nessee Department of Education found that home schooled children in 3rd
grade scored in the 90th percentile in reading on the standardized test and
that public school students scored in the 78th percentile. In math, the
home schooled children scored, on average, in the 86.8th percentile, while
their public school counterparts scored in the 80th percentile.
Similarly, the State Department of Education in Alaska has surveyed
home schooled children's test results every other year since 1981, and has
found home schooled children to be scoring approximately 16 percentile
points higher, on the average, than the children of the same grades in con-
ventional schools.
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Circuit did not spend much time speculating about this seeming in-
congruity, the court noted that if the District was concerned with Pe-
terson's ability to do his job, "the District had the power conferred by
Idaho law to inspect and approve the proposed home instruction cur-
riculum .... ."9 Instead of this course of action, however, the District
decided on May 6, 1992 to reassign Peterson to an elementary school
teaching position. On August 31, 1992, the Petersons filed suit.
The Ninth Circuit viewed Peterson's decision to home school his
children as one protected by the free exercise of religion. Specifically,
the court held that "as to the exercise of religion by parents in their
choice of schooling for their children, the right is established by Wis-
consin v. Yoder."10 However, the court also observed that the religious
right to home school is not unlimited. "The state's own high interest
in education limits it.
'I1
Limitations aside, however, Peterson stands for the proposition
that home school free exercise claims are judicially defensible. Ac-
cordingly, this Comment uses the Peterson case as a springboard to
more fully examine five topics: (1) the historical background of home
schooling in the United States; (2) free exercise claims for home
schooling, and what the Peterson case adds to the discussion; (3) the
meaning of the state's high interest in education; (4) the compelling
interest test and whether it is still viable; and (5) a brief assessment of
the expected future impact of the Peterson decision on free exercise
causes of action as they relate to home education.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Even though home education is often thought of as a current
affair, its roots stretch back to, and before, the colonial days of
... Several studies have been done to measure home schoolers' "self-
concept" which is the key indicator for establishing a child's self-esteem. A
child's degree of self-esteem, of course, is the best objective measurement of
his ability to interact successfully on a social level. One such study was con-
ducted using the Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale to evaluate 224
home schooled children. The study found that one-half of the children
scored above the 90th percentile and only 10.3% scored below the national
average.
J. Michael Smith & ChristopherJ. Klicka, Review of Ohio Law Regarding Home School 14
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 301, 303-04 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
9 Peterson, 118 F.3d at 1357.
10 Id. at 1356 (citation omitted).
11 Id. at 1358.
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America. 12 "For example, the English Poor Laws of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries were designed to teach poor children a trade to
help make them productive citizens .... ."1 Accordingly, as one com-
mentator put it, "[h]istorically, the education of children in the
United States was a matter of parental discretion. Decisions to edu-
cate or not to educate, and the substance of that education-method
and curriculum-were made by the parents as a right.' 4
Originally, education was not a government responsibility; the
duty to educate children fell primarily on the parent, and parents
took that duty seriously. As supporters of home education are quick
to point out, some of this country's most revered citizens were either
partly or completely products of home schooling. "Presidents Wood-
row Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and George Washington studied at
home.... John Quincy Adams went directly from home to Harvard;
and Frank Vandiver, a distinguished Civil War historian and until re-
cently president of Texas A&M University, studied at home.' 5
Yet as the years passed and American government grew, the bur-
den of educating our young fell increasingly to the state. The reasons
for this shift from an educational paradigm based on parental control
to one of state responsibility are beyond the scope of this Comment;
however, a natural outcome of the shift was an increase in laws
designed to regulate education. One of the earliest education laws
enacted was the "Massachusetts School Law of 1647, commonly re-
ferred to as the 'Ye Old Deluder Satan' statute. This law required the
establishment of schools to teach writing, reading, and Bible study as
the means of preventing Satan from succeeding in the battle for the
souls of women, men, and children."1 6 Soon thereafter, nearly every
colony passed a statute similar to Massachusetts's.17 While these stat-
utes were primarily religious in motivation, they set the stage for in-
creasing governmental oversight of education.
Then, in 1852, again in Massachusetts, the first modern educa-
tion statute was enacted.' 8 This statute had as its aim "to teach chil-
12 See Kara T. Burgess, Comment, The Constitutionality of Home Education Statutes,
55 UMKC L. REv. 69, 69-70 (1986).
13 Donald D. Dorman, Note, Michigan's Teacher Certification Requirement as Applied
to Religiously Motivated Home Schools, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 733, 734 (1990).
14 James W. Tobak & Perry A. Zirkel, Home Instruction: An Analysis of the Statutes
and Case Law, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1982) (footnote omitted).
15 Michael S. Shepherd, Home Schooling: Dimensions of Controversy, 1970-1984, 31 J.
CHURCH & ST. 101, 102-03 (1989).
16 WnIAM M. GORDON ET AL., THE LAW OF HOME SCHOOUNG 6 (1994).
17 See id at 6-7.
18 See id. at 7.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
dren to read, write, and compute... ; to eliminate truancy; and, to
obviate abuses in child labor.... Accordingly, it was social, not reli-
gious, reform that precipitated a shift in the law, moving the educa-
tion of children from home to the public schools."1 9 By 1900 nearly
every state in the union had some sort of obligatory attendance law.20
"Today every state has some form of compulsory attendance statute."21
Ironically, as government control of the educational system grew,
so too did citizen dissatisfaction with that system.22 Early revolts came
from parents wanting to move their children from public schools to
private schools. At first, parents faced strong opposition to this deci-
sion.2 3 Eventually though, the federal judiciary recognized a legiti-
mate right on the part of parents to choose which system would
control the education of their children. One example is the
landmark decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters24 which held unconstitu-
tional an Oregon law requiring attendance at a public school.
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to stand-
ardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations. 25
While parental control in education was initially limited to a
choice between public versus private schooling, more was soon to
come. With the growth of the home-schooling movement in the late
19 Id. at 7.
20 See Tobak & Zirkel, supra note 14, at 14.
21 Id.
22 A case in point is the experience ofJohn T. Gatto:
For example, John Taylor Gatto, recent New York Teacher of the year quit
after twenty-six years of teaching, because the public schools were a dismal
failure. In an interview, Mr. Gatto said he quit because he didn't want to
"hurt" kids anymore. He also said "government schooling... kills the family
by monopolizing the best times of childhood and by teaching disrespect for
home and parents."
CHRISTOPHER J. KLicKA, THE RIGHT TO HOME SCHOOL: A GUIDE TO THE LAW ON PAR-
ENTS' RIGHTS IN EDUCATION 3 (1998); see also M. David Gelfand, Assessing the Challenges
to Public Education in the 1980s, 14 URB. LAW. xi (1982) (stating that parents are often
dissatisfied with public education because of its cost, the role of teachers, and the type
of curriculum used).
23 See KucKA, supra note 22, at 10.
24 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
25 Id. at 535.
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1960s and early 1970s, parents began to push for more choice.26 The
foundation for the modem home school movement was laid nearly
thirty years ago by two pioneers: Raymond Moore and John Holt.
In 1968, Moore challenged a proposal by the state of California to
lower the age at which children enter school. Moore researched a
series of studies conducted by professors and doctoral students
around the world. His conclusion laid the foundation for the modem
home-schooling movement. Not only did his research challenge the
need to lower the age of children entering school, but his study re-
flected the fact that children learn more in a few hours of one on one
tutoring than they can in a whole day of education in a group setting.
Moore used this research to reach out to local communities around
America to encourage parents to consider home schooling.
Contemporaneous to Moore's work, John Holt, a professional ed-
ucator, challenged public education because of its lack of humanity.
Specifically, Holt criticized schools as "sterile, artificial, and divorced
from real life experiences."27 Eventually, Holt concluded that the
most humane way to educate a child was through home schooling.
Parents chose, and continue to choose, to home school their chil-
dren for a variety of reasons. Some of the more typical reasons are
concerns regarding academic standards, violence in the classroom,
and a clash between private and public values. However, as important
as these issues are to many parents, the primary motivation behind the
growing home school movement 28 is a deep religious conviction. 29 "A
number of Mormons, Seventh-Day Adventists, and Amish traditionally
have opted for home schooling. The more recent movement has
been among Fundamentalist and Evangelical Protestants."30 In fact, a
recent study "of over 2000 home school families found that 93.8 per-
cent of the fathers and 96.4 percent of the mothers describe them-
selves as 'born-again' Christians."3 ' These parents believe that God
26 See generally GORDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 1-4.
27 Eugene C. Bjorklun, Home Schooled Students: Access to Public School Extracurricular
Activities, 109 W. EDuc. L. R.xv. , 2 (1996).
28 "Researchers have estimated the number of American children in home
schools to be as high as one million." James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Reli-
gious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Chil-
dren of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1321, 1350 n.112 (1996).
29 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 2-3.
30 John S. Baker, Jr., Parent-Centered Education, 3 NO=E DAMEJ.L. ETmIcs & PuB.
POL'Y 535, 549 (1988).
31 KucKA, supra note 22, at 49 n.1. The following example, excerpted from the
Wall StreetJournal, typifies this religious motivation:
The judgment of God-final, forever-is the first lesson in this classroom
today.
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has given them both the responsibility and authority to educate their
children.3 2
II. PETERSON, FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS, AND HOME SCHOOLING
The pivotal case accepting a First Amendment, freedom of reli-
gion justification for home schooling was Wisconsin v Yoder.33 The
Yoders, an Amish family, rejected state sponsored education beyond
the eighth grade because they "believed, in accordance with the tenets
of Old Order Amish communities generally, that their children's at-
tendance at high school, public or private, was contrary to the Amish
Religion and way of life."'34 Instead of participation in public educa-
tion, the Amish proposed bringing their children home to educate
and train them vocationally. The Court agreed, and granted an
Amish exception to Wisconsin's mandatory school attendance statute
for at least two reasons.35
While the order of the reasons is not dispositive, the court placed
considerable weight on a combination of the following factors. First,
"the Amish in this case have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity
of their religious beliefs .... -36 Here, the Court was concerned with
separating religious from purely philosophical beliefs. Accordingly,
"And whosoever was not found written in the book of life was cast into
the lake of fire," reads Cheryl Freidline from the Book of Revelation. Then,
softly, she asks "Does God want anyone to go into the lake of fire?"
"No," replies Amelia Freidline, an eight-year old with a voice that is in-
nocence itself.
"What does God want them to do?"
"Repent."
The two, mother and daughter, are sitting on the second floor of the
Freidlines' brick cape colonial home here in the western suburbs of Kansas
City, [Missouri]. Cheryl and her husband, Blaine, evangelical Chris-
tians .... have chosen to home-school Amelia. In an extra bedroom they
have replicated the look and feel of a classroom ....
Yet the room has features you would never encounter in a public
school. They are clues to a different way of seeing the world, to a different
perspective on eternity. They are outward signs that the Freidlines are part
of what has been called a "parallel culture" .
The parallel culture is ultimately a culture of faith.
Dennis Farney, Culture of Faith: For Kansas' Freidlines, Life, Politics, Religion Are Mostly
Inseparable, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1996, at Al.
32 See KLICKA, supra note 22, at 49.
33 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
34 Id. at 209.
35 See id. at 235.
36 IM
[VOL. 75"-2
1999] COMMENT: PETERSOAr V. MINIDOA COUNTY SCffOOL 671
the Yoder Court took great pains to point out the religious history and
culture of the Amish people.37 Second, the Amish demonstrated "the
adequacy of their alternative mode of continuing informal vocational
education .... 38 In other words, the Amish had developed a home-
schooling system designed to train their children to more easily adapt
to the rigors of Amish life.
The Yoder Court also noted that the entire Amish community,
and not just the Yoder family, rejected public education.3 9 There is
some reason to think that this community rejection formed a third
factor. 40 However, the degree to which the factor is independently
important-especially from the first factor-is not entirely clear. In
other words, is the proof of an individual's sincere religious objection
found in the fact that his objection is supported by official church
dogma? Or, is it that a sincere religious objection requires two
things-the individual must sincerely object, and the church must ob-
ject? It seems more likely, however, that the Yoder Court viewed the
sincerity factor within the framework of the Amish community; that is,
the Yoder family had a sincerely held religious belief, and the proof of
this sincerity lay in the fact that the entire Amish community believed
the same way.
It was this "third" requirement, however, that formed the prevail-
ing religious justification argument for home schooling from the time
of Yoder to the time of Peterson. The accepted legal thinking has gen-
erally held that withdrawal of one's children from public schools on
the ground that it violates a family's religious beliefs is unacceptable
unless the family's church rejects public education. Illustrative of this
principle is State v. Kasuboski,41 Duro v. District Attorney,42 and Burrow v.
State.43
In Kasuboski, Charles and Mary Ann Kasuboski were convicted of
violating Wisconsin law requiring parents to send their children to
public or private school. "The Kasuboskis, who are members and min-
isters of the Life Science Church (church), claimed to have withdrawn
their children from the Omro public school system for religious rea-
sons."44 However, at trial, several witnesses testified that nothing in
the Life Science Church doctrine forbade attendance at public
37 See id. at 209-10.
38 Id at 235.
39 See id. at 210-11.
40 See generally id. at 235-36.
41 275 N.W.2d 101 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978).
42 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983).
43 669 S.W.2d 441 (Ark. 1984).
44 Kasubosk4 275 N.W.2d at 102-03.
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school.45 In fact, it was pointed out that several members sent their
children to public school and that no member was shunned or
scorned for this decision. 46
After recognizing the importance of compulsory education, the
Kasuboski court went on to state that this type of regulation "can be
avoided in this case only by a showing that the Kasuboskis' claims are
rooted in religious beliefs. No such showing appears in the record.
Neither the Basic Bible Church nor its subsidiary, the Life Science
Church, has a tenet against education."47 In other words, the
Kasuboski court rejected the sincerity of the Kasuboskis' religious con-
viction because their educational beliefs were individual and not cor-
porate. While the Kasuboski court spent more time than the Yoder
Court in examining the need for corporate support to prove sincerity
of religious beliefs, not much additional ground was covered. In the
end, the Kasuboski court rejected Kasuboskis' claim because their be-
lief was not religious. And the reason that their belief was not reli-
gious was that nothing in their church's doctrine or teachings
supported the Kasuboskis' objections.
An additional example of this legal principle is found in Duro v.
District Attorney.48 The Duros, members of the Pentecostal Church, re-
fused to comply with North Carolina's compulsory school attendance
law. "According to [the Duros], exposing [their] children to others
who do not share [their] religious beliefs would corrupt them. ' 49
While the Fourth Circuit had no doubt that the Duros were motivated
by a sincere religious belief, the court nevertheless refused to extend
the Amish exception to Pentacostalists. The court noted that
"[t] his religion does not require that children be taught at home; in
fact, the majority of children Whose parents are members of the
Pentecostal church .. .are enrolled in a public school. Notwith-
standing this, [the Duros] refuse[] to enroll [their] children in a
public school or the only available nonpublic school .... 50
The Duro court-like the Kasuboski court before it-distin-
guished Yoder largely on the grounds that the Amish community had
rejected public education beyond the eighth grade, whereas Duro's
religious convictions were peculiar to them. Put another way,
"[d]espite Duro's sincere religious belief"-51 the court refused to ex-
45 See id. at 103.
46 See id.
47 Id at 105.
48 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983).
49 Id. at 97.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 99.
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tend the Amish exception. The court justified its refusal by stating
that the Duros had failed to demonstrate "that home instruction will
prepare [their] children to be self-sufficient participants in our mod-
em society or enable them to participate intelligently in our political
system, which, as the Supreme Court stated, is a compelling interest of
the state. '52
It is interesting to note that the Duro court did not provide any
examples of Duro's failure to meet the rather nebulous goals of self-
sufficiency and intelligent participation in our political system. The
Duro court recognized that its concern with the future well-being of
the Duro children was a departure from Yoder.53 Yet, the court be-
lieved that the case before it was factually distinguishable from Yoder
on the ground that Yoder's children were older and had already re-
ceived eight grades of public education. 54 Unfortunately, the court
never addressed the issue of how many years of public education chil-
dren must have before they are adequately prepared for the world in
which they live.
Whereas the Kasuboski court measured sincerity based on con-
formity to church doctrine, the Duro court recognized sincerity de-
spite church teaching. Accordingly, the Duro court leaned more
toward the position that a valid free-exercise home schooling claim
required two things-a sincerely held religious objection and a con-
curring church objection.
A final example is Burrow v. State.55 In this case, Wayne Burrow
was charged with violating Arkansas law for refusing to send his minor
child to school. As the Burrow court pointed out, Arkansas law re-
quired every parent "in custody or charge [of] any child or children
between the ages of seven ... and fifteen ... (both inclusive) shall
send such child or children to a public, private, or parochial
school. '56 Instead, Burrow wanted to educate his child at home.57
Burrow challenged the constitutionality of the Arkansas law as a
violation of his First Amendment right to freely exercise the practice
of his religion.58 The Burrow court, while recognizing the sincerity of
Burrow's religious beliefs,59 nevertheless rejected his claim. In ruling
on his appeal, the court noted two things. First, Burrow made "no
52 Id
53 See id at 100 (Sprouse, J., concurring).
54 See id. at 98-99.
55 669 S.W.2d 441 (Ark. 1984).
56 Id at 442 (quoting Aiu. CODE ANN. § 80-1502 (repealed 1980)).
57 See id
58 See id at 443.
59 See id. at 443-44.
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showing of a religious or cultural tradition comparable to that in
Yoder."60 And, second, even though Burrow's beliefs were sincere,
there was no evidence that forbidding Burrow from home schooling
his child would result in any serious harm "to the practices of a dis-
tinct group. 61 The Burrow court did not clarify whether this last state-
ment meant that Burrow needed the support of a formal religious
body. However, the fact that this court bifurcated Burrow's sincere
belief from the practices of a distinct religious body is telling. It is
obvious that, at a minimum, the court was arguing that Burrow's be-
liefs (which were undoubtedly sincere 62) by themselves were not suffi-
cient to warrant First Amendment protection.
Whether Yoder, Kasuboski, Duro, and Burrow reflect any single
trend of free-exercise jurisprudence is not entirely clear. It appears
that these four decisions stand for the proposition that an individual's
sincerely held religious belief must, in some measure, be tied to offi-
cial church teaching. But the exact nature of this link is not consist-
ently applied. Neither is the rationale for this requirement fully
developed. At times an individual's sincerely held religious belief is
proven by church support. At other times it seems more like a com-
plete division-both the individual and her church must object.
If the latter position accurately reflects judicial thinking, it raises
definite concerns about conflicts with many of the holdings of our
nation's highest court.63 However, the lack of consistency in First
Amendment freedom of religion theory proves more than this com-
ment can explore. It is sufficient to note that there are a variety of
religious freedom theories, and, as observed in the cases recently re-
viewed, the result is not always clear. Nevertheless, the point for this
discussion still holds-that courts, in some fashion, test an individual's
sincerely held religious belief by the plumb line of official (whatever
that means) church doctrine.
Erupting on the legal scene to challenge this principle was Peter-
son v. Minidoka County School District No. 331.64 As already observed,
Peterson's complaint was straightforward: the school district
threatened to demote him after he announced his intention to home
school his children. Peterson stated "his reason for home schooling
his children: it was that in every course of study they would learn that
God as the creator of all things was related to the subject at hand."65
60 Id. at 444.
61 Id.
62 See id. at 443.
63 See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
64 118 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1997).
65 Id at 1356.
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Given the mixed reception that personal religious arguments had re-
ceived in prior home-schooling cases, 66 some might think that Peter-
son was taking an unwarranted risk. Fortunately for Peterson, the
Ninth Circuit chose to face the First Amendment argument and re-
solve the relevant issue.
Peterson was a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints.67 As the member of a theistic religious body, Peterson was
motivated to home school his children out of a deep religious convic-
tion.68 However, this conviction, as manifested in Peterson's choice of
education, was personal to him. Unlike the claim in Yoder, in which
an entire religious order stood opposed to public education, Peter-
son's claim was based on what he alone believed his faith demanded.
After noting that Peterson's church was not opposed to outside educa-
tion and that his claim was based on individual religious motivation,
the court stated that "[t]here is nothing in the First Amendment's
guarantee of the free exercise of religion that restricts the guarantee
to the requirements of a church.... What the Constitution protects is
an act 'rooted in religious belief.' It is undisputed that Peterson's act
was so rooted."69
In one sense, this part of the Peterson decision was a radical break
from earlier jurisprudence. Even if one takes the view that prior deci-
sions had not required both individual and corporate elements, but
merely held that the sincerity of the individual belief was measured by
corporate support, the Peterson court was going beyond even this level
ofjustification. The Ninth Circuit holding stands for the proposition
that regardless of corporate support-or lack thereof-an individual's
religious belief stands or falls on the individual's level of sincerity.
One of the most interesting features of Peterson is the way it easily,
almost naturally, expanded Yoder to the case at hand. One is left won-
dering why it never happened before. What was it about the prior
cases that made the courts cling to the belief that individuals were not
entitled to a free exercise claim for home schooling apart from their
religious communities? It seems strange indeed, especially in a coun-
try that exalts the individual and individual choice, that in this limited
area of religious freedom our courts have required something more.
One can only speculate as to the reasons for judicial skepticism
concerning an individual, as opposed to corporate, free exercise claim
for home schooling. This is especially true in light of the Supreme
66 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
67 See Peterson, 118 F.3d at 1356.
68 See id at 1355.
69 Md2 at 1357 (citations omitted).
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Court holdings in Frazee v. illinois Department of Employment Security7°
and Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division.71
In both cases, individuals were denied unemployment benefits be-
cause they left theirjobs because of their religious convictions. In Fra-
zee, the plaintiff was denied benefits because he refused to accept ajob
that required him to work on Sunday.72 Similarly, in Thomas, the
plaintiff was refused benefits because he would not work at a job that
required him to participate in armament production.7
Both plaintiffs, Frazee and Thomas, claimed that they could not
work because their individual religious beliefs would not allow them
to do what the job required. And in both cases, the Supreme Court
held that the individual beliefs do not require the support of a church
doctrine, tenet, or teaching for First Amendment protection to ap-
ply.74 Take for example the holding in Thomas:
[T]he guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are
shared by all of the members of a religious sect. Particularly in this
sensitive area, it is not within the judicial function and judicial com-
petence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more
correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts
are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation. 7 5
In light of the general Supreme Court teaching that individual
religious beliefs, without more, are sufficient to trigger application of
free exercise doctrine, one is left wondering what it was about home
education that made the lower courts require more. One possible ex-
planation is that it was nothing more than an evolutionary process of
legal thought. There is little doubt that Yoder planted the seed for an
"individual" argument. The Court repeatedly recognized the rights of
parents to direct the religious education of their children. For exam-
ple, the Court noted that parents have "fundamental rights and inter-
ests, such as... the traditional interest of parents with respect to the
religious upbringing of their children."76
Additionally, the Court observed that "this case involves the fun-
damental interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the State, to
guide the religious future and education of their children .... This
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
70 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
71 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
72 See Frazee, 489 U.S. at 830.
73 See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 709.
74 See Frazee, 489 U.S. at 834-35; Thomas 450 U.S. at 715-16.
75 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16.
76 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
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established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."77 In
addition, legal scholars after Yoder recognized the importance of First
Amendment protection for individual decisions. For example, one
commentator went so far as to state, "If there is any single unifying
principle underlying the two religion clauses, therefore, it is that indi-
vidual choice in matters of religion should remain free: individual de-
cisions are to be protected ....
Of course the previous comments cannot explain the various
courts' disparate holdings when it comes to home-schooling issues.
Even the Peterson court did not attempt to elucidate its break from
historical jurisprudence. Indeed, it seems likely that the Peterson court
would not consider its holding a break from anything. The fact that
the court tied its holding to Yoder reflects the fact that the Ninth Cir-
cuit saw itself as squarely within sound legal doctrine. Indeed, given
the holdings in Thomas and Frazee, there is every reason to believe that
the Peterson court was doing nothing more than enunciating accepted
judicial thought.
One of the comments of the Frazee court, however, may shed light
on this muddled issue of an individual's sincerely held religious belief:
Undoubtedly, membership in an organized religious denomination,
especially one with a specific tenet forbidding members to work on
Sunday, would simplify the problem of identifying sincerely held
religious beliefs, but we reject the notion that to claim the protec-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause, one must be responding to the
commands of a particular religious organization. 79
When the Frazee court rejected the need to have the support of an
organized religious body, it did so recognizing that identifying an in-
dividual's sincerely held religious beliefs would be much easier if the
individual was responding to a specific church tenet forbidding them
from participation in the particular practice in question (whether
working on Sunday, building weapons, or home schooling children).
This ease of recognition goes far towards explaining much of the pre-
77 Id. at 232.
78 Gail Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Reli-
gion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 805, 810 (1978); see also Leslie
GielowJacobs, Adding Complexity to Confusion and Seeing the Light: Feminist Legal Insights
and the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 7 YALE J.L. & FEEsn'sM 137, 159 (1995)
("[T]he putative purpose of the religion clauses is not to set behavioral norms, but to
preserve a space for individual decisions. Individual choice and volition are crucial to
the value of the interest protected.") (citation omitted).
79 Frazee, 489 U.S. at 834.
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Peterson judicial thinking. Our American courts have long been hesi-
tant to probe the depths of theological issues.8 0
Accordingly, it appears that judges find religious issues easier to
decide, and perhaps more acceptable, when there is an official proxy.
In the case of sincerely held religious beliefs, a readily available proxy
is the official teaching of a formal religious body. The advantages of
deferring to a religious body are at least twofold. First, this deference
saves judges from having to make religious decisions-decisions which
many judges feel less than prepared to make. In other words, by de-
ferring to official church teaching, a judge need not decide which
individual belief is sincere and which one is not. For as the Supreme
Court held in Lynch v. Donnelly,81 state endorsement of religious be-
liefs violates the Establishment Clause.
Second, this deference serves the added benefit of making judi-
cial decisions acceptable. Acceptable, of course, does not necessarily
mean correct. However, acceptable decisions serve the function of
creating an aura of fairness. By deferring to a recognized religious
body in issues that are outside of standard judicial bounds, judges can
hold themselves out as protectors of cherished institutions.
In the end, though, whether the change in judicial thinking over
sincerely held religious beliefs reflects an evolutionary process, defer-
ence to an acceptable proxy, or a more determined resolve to wrestle
with difficult issues, one thing is clear-the Peterson decision stands for
the proposition that free exercise home-school claims deserve the
same legal standards as all other free exercise claims. Along with this
view comes all the traditional legal baggage. For example, the Peterson
court clung to the view that a state may, at times, override a person's
free exercise of religion.
III. THE STATE'S HIGH INTEREST IN EDUCATION
"Frank Peterson had the constitutional right to exercise his reli-
gion. This precious liberty, however, is not so absolute that its exer-
cise may be enjoyed without collateral consequences if, in exceptional
circumstances, that exercise impacts a compelling state interest."8 2
With those few words, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that, in certain situa-
tions, the state may override a citizen's right to free exercise of reli-
gion. Of course, this statement is not a new proposition.
80 See generally Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971); Feldstein v. Chris-
tian Science Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974,978 (1983).
81 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
82 118 F.3d at 1357.
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No constitutional right enjoys limitless protection. Even First
Amendment rights are subject to certain strictures. Thus it has been
held that the right to free speech is not absolute.8 3 Examples of free
speech restrictions include restrictions on speech that are defama-
tory8 4 or libelous.8 5 So too, religious rights are not without certain
constraints. For example, we limit religious support by the state;86 we
even support punishing individuals when their religious practices con-
flict with other ideals (for example, holding Native Americans crimi-
nally liable for the illegal use of Peyote-even when this use is
directed by their religion8 7 ). Courts have regularly overruled an indi-
vidual's free exercise claim when the balance tips in favor of the state's
interest. Just what causes the scales to tip one way or the other,
though, has not always been clear.
The Peterson court observed, however, that parents have a consti-
tutional right to participate in the determination of their children's
education.8 8 However, this right, as we have seen, is not absolute.
"The state's own high interest in education limits it."89 So for the Pe-
terson court, at least, the state's compelling interest was tied to the
state's interest in education. But what exactly did the court mean by
its high interest in education? Was the question whether the state had
83 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all
times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and nar-
rowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which
have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These in-
clude the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that
such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Id. (citations omitted).
84 See Lauderback v. American Broad. Cos., 741 F.2d 193, 195 (8th Cir. 1984)
("While the right of free speech provides absolute protection to statements which are
purely opinions, it is conceded that statements clothed as opinion which imply that
they are based on undisclosed, defamatory facts are not protected.") (citations
omitted).
85 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
86 See Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
780 (1973) ("In the absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the state aid
derived from public funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and nonideo-
logical purposes, it is clear from our cases that direct aid in whatever form is
invalid.").
87 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
88 118 F.3d at 1358.
89 Id.
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an interest in publicly educating Peterson's children, or in having ef-
fective principals? Clearly, the question on appeal was "whether the
District's . . . concerns about Frank Peterson's work as principal out-
weighed the Petersons' constitutional right .... That question is re-
solved by ... the [laws regarding] free exercise of religion."90
Yet, while the Court recognized that the compelling interest in
the present case was Peterson's work, it also made clear that other
issues were relevant. In quoting from Pierce v. Society of Sisters the court
recognized that parents have the liberty "to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control."91 In the court's concur-
ring opinion, Judge Fletcher made the timely observation that "[w] hat
the district court had to balance, then, was Peterson's right to free
exercise of his religion and to control the education of his chil-
dren.., against the district's vague concerns that Peterson might no
longer be an effective leader. '92
In other words, the school district focused only on the state's in-
terest in effective employees and did not account for Peterson's con-
stitutionally protected interest in educating his children. The Ninth
Circuit, however, realized that not only does a state have a high inter-
est in having effective teachers, but parents have a high interest in
educating their children.93
The issue then was one of balancing. If the state's interests
(whatever they are) outweigh the individual's right to free exercise,
the state wins. The reverse is also true. As for Peterson, Judge Noo-
nan commented, "The District could only assert a compelling interest
if well-informed persons understood Peterson's action as a vote of no
confidence in the school system rather than as the practice of his reli-
gion."94 Peterson, however, never expressed a lack of faith in the edu-
cation system. His only concern was with integrating his religious
faith with his children's education.
Accordingly, the District's criticism came down to a general con-
cern that because Peterson wanted to home school his children, the
faculty and parents would lose confidence in his credibility as a princi-
pal. Judge Noonan found this argument less than compelling.
Rather, he held that the school district was incorrect "in reasoning
that a religiously-motivated school principal following his conscience
as to his own children would somehow be the object of scorn or dis-
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 1361.
93 See id. at 1357-58.
94 Id, at 1357.
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trust of his faculty or parent patrons. The district court as a matter of
law rightly determined that the District's interests were not
compelling. '95
With this holding, Peterson's free exercise claim was established.
Apart from noting the state's high interest in education and expres-
sing a vague concern over defending a state's statutory scheme in edu-
cation, however, the Ninth Circuit failed to leave a clear framework
for understanding what might constitute "a state's compelling inter-
est." This lack of framework, though, should not be surprising. There
is no evidence that our courts have ever developed a principled defini-
tion of the "compelling interest" test-if indeed calling it a test is fair,
for a test assumes some measure of verifiable objectivity. And as San-
ford Levinson once observed, "[A]nyone who actually teaches consti-
tutional law knows that few things are less clear than the operation of
the compelling interest doctrine."96 Compelling interest tests often
serve a more amorphous role; they are often merely a means ofjustify-
ing a judge's intuitive sense of what is fair.
IV. Tim COMPELING INTEREST TEST
The compelling interest test, as we know it, was first propounded
by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner.97 In Sherbert, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina upheld the denial of unemployment benefits
to Sherbert who refused to work, because of her religious beliefs, on
Saturday.98 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, reversed this de-
cision because it violated the claimant's free exercise rights. Brennan
stated that for South Carolina's decision to withstand constitutional
scrutiny "it must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary
represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of
free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of
[her] religion may be justified by a 'compelling state interest. "'99
The Court went on to hold that denial of unemployment benefits
imposes an unwarranted burden on Sherbert's right to the free exer-
cise of religion. Next, Brennan considered whether there was a com-
pelling state interest that justified abrogating Sherbert's rights.
Ultimately, the court decided there was not. However, in the process
95 Id.
96 Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Compelling State Interest: On "Due Process of Law-
making" and the Professional Responsibility of the Public Layer, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 1035,
1036 (1994).
97 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
98 See id, at 401.
99 Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
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of making this decision the court attempted to outline the contours of
compelling interest doctrine. "It is basic that no showing merely of a
rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in
this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o] nly the gravest abuses, en-
dangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limita-
tion." 00 This statement was not exactly a bright line definition. In
fact, the definition seems to raise more questions than it answers. Af-
ter all, what is a "highly sensitive" constitutional area? What does the
court mean by "gravest abuses"? Or what is a "paramount interest"?
This is the definition, however, that lower courts were left to flesh out.
In one sense, talk of a compelling interest test is rather artificial.
For the Supreme Court, in Employment Division v. Smith,101 supposedly
invalidated the compelling interest test. The issue in Smith was
whether Native American Indians had a constitutionally protected
right to smoke peyote as part of a recognized religious ritual. The
claimants in Smith lost theirjobs as a result of their use of peyote, and
because of this "misconduct," they were also denied unemployment
benefits.10 2 The Supreme Court of Oregon held that, while the use of
peyote violated established criminal laws, this violation was invalid be-
cause it breached the claimant's free exercise rights.
The Supreme Court, Justice Scalia writing for the majority, re-
versed, holding that, so long as it "is not the object of the [law] but
merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise
valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended." 10 3 The
Supreme Court then turned its attention to the compelling interest
doctrine. In speaking on this issue, the court held,
If the "compelling interest" test is to be applied at all, then, it must
be applied across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously
commanded. Moreover, if "compelling interest" really means what
it says..., many laws will not meet the test. Any society adopting
such a system would be courting anarchy .... Precisely because "we
are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every con-
ceivable religious preference," and precisely because we value and
protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of
deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector,
every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the
highest order.104
100 Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
101 Employment Div., v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
102 See id. at 874.
103 Id. at 878.
104 Id. at 888 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)).
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Smith then stands for the proposition that a facially neutral and
generally applicable law does not require a compelling interest (or
strict scrutiny) standard when free exercise claims are implicated.
The legal community was quick to recognize that the holding in Smith,
at least conceptually, did away with the compelling interest test.105 Ac-
cordingly, not every legal scholar was happy with this result. As Doug-
las Laycock lamented, "The Court held that every American has the
right to believe in a religion, but no right to practice it.106 However,
some are not convinced, including apparently the Ninth Circuit, that
the compelling interest test was destroyed rather than merely re-
worked. 10 7 Thus, in what has come to be known as the "hybrid" ap-
proach, the compelling interest test has taken on a new life.
The so-called hybrid test is meant to describe a situation where
the courts are still encouraged to use the compelling interest test. In
reality, the hybrid test is more accurately viewed as an exception to the
Smith Court's rejection of the compelling interest test. The Court (in
dicta) held that it was possible to challenge a neutral and generally
applicable law when the religiously motivated challenger demon-
strates that the law affects "the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction
with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and
of the press.., or the right of parents.., to direct the education of
their children."' 08
So the challenger must establish two claims. First, it must be
shown that the law has a negative impact on the challenger's constitu-
tionally protected right to the free exercise of religion. Second, it
must be shown that this law also implicates an additional constitu-
tional right. When these two points have been established, then the
state must demonstrate a compelling interest. 0 9 It should be pointed
out, however, that the Smith Court never mandated any exception to
its rejection of the compelling interest test. Nevertheless, lower courts
have regularly held that this "hybrid test" should be applied. Consider
the following examples.
105 See Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd. Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 932 (6th Cir. 1991)
("Smith sharply criticized the use of Sherbert balancing, finding that a compelling gov-
ernment interest test, while useful in evaluating government distinctions based on
race or government regulations on the content of speech, is inappropriate in free
exercise cases.").
106 Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REv. 221,
221 (1993).
107 See Krafchow v. Town of Woodstock, No. 96-CV-1538, 1999 WL 645687, at *14
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1999).
108 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citations omitted).
109 See State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 240 n.8 (Wis. 1996).
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In Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings,1 10 a local church
sued the city claiming the city's zoning ordinance violated the
church's free exercise of religion and its constitutional right to free-
dom of speech, freedom of association, due process, and equal protec-
tion."' The court recognized that the hybrid test is implicated when
laws "violate the free exercise clause and some other constitutional
right."'112 And further, the court found, when this combined violation
occurs, the resulting cause of action "will receive strict scrutiny.""u 3
In other words, when hybrid rights are violated, the state must
show a compelling interest before the law can stand. In this case, how-
ever, the lower court found that the Cornerstone Bible Church had
not established that hybrid rights were violated. The court rejected
the church's argument that its right to free exercise of religion was
violated and also held that the church failed to prove a violation of an
additional constitutional right." 4
On appeal,"1 5 however, the Eighth Circuit reversed on the issue
of hybrid rights stating, "Our reversal of the summary judgment or-
ders breathes life back into the Church's 'hybrid rights' claim; thus,
the district court should consider this claim on remand."" 6 The
Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's summary judgment on the
free exercise claim except insofar as it could be combined with an-
other right, thus establishing a hybrid rights claim. Specifically, the
court overturned summary judgment on the Church's free speech
and equal protection claims, presumably leaving the door open for
combining one of these with the free exercise claim."l 7
Consider also the case of Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School Dis-
trict No. I-L.1 8 In this case, a home schooled child and her parents
brought suit because the school district refused to allow the child to
attend public school on a part-time basis. The Swanson family
claimed that this refusal violated their free exercise rights and their
parental right to direct the education of their child. While the Swan-
son court rejected the free exercise claim because the school board's
policy was neutral, the court explicitly recognized the validity of the
110 740 F. Supp. 654 (D. Minn. 1990).
111 See id. at 657.
112 Id at 670.
113 Id.
114 See id. at 670.
115 See Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991).
116 Id at 473.
117 See id.
118 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998).
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hybrid rights test, but also noted that "[i]t is difficult to delineate the
exact contours of the hybrid-rights theory discussed in Smith."" 9
In attempting to describe the limits of the hybrid rights test, the
court stated that "[a] t a minimum.., it cannot be true that a plaintiff
can simply invoke the parental rights doctrine, combine it with a
claimed free-exercise right, and thereby force the government to
demonstrate the presence of a compelling state interest."' 20 The
Swanson court recognized parents' rights to direct the education of
their children as a valid constitutional right; however, this right did
not extend as far as the Swanson family would have liked.121
While parents have the right to send their children to private,
public, or home schools, Swanson tells us that they do not have an
absolute right to do so however they please. While the parental right
to direct the education of children is a constitutionally-protected
right, this right has certain boundaries. And, when the boundaries of
this right are crossed, that right cannot be used in combination with a
free exercise claim for the purpose of invoking a hybrid-rights
analysis.
A final example is Vandiver v. Hardin County Board ofEducation.122
This case grew out of a high school student's (Brian Vandiver's) claim
that because the defendant required him to pass equivalency exami-
nations in order to receive credit for his religious home study pro-
gram, his free exercise rights and his right to due process and equal
protection were violated. The court first analyzed Kentucky's law and
determined that the "regulation of public school testing and academic
standing is a valid and neutral law of general applicability within the
meaning of Smith, so that a free exercise challenge is presumably
precluded."'12
However, the court also noted that "Smith does recognize a spe-
cial place in [F]irst [A]mendment jurisprudence for those 'hybrid'
statutes which affect not only religiously motivated actions but also
119 Id. at 699.
120 Id at 700.
121 See id. at 702.
122 925 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the requirement of a compelling interest test for facially
neutral laws is limited to circumstances where the law directly conflicts with religious
conduct or belief and to cases where hybrid-rights are implicated); SouthJersey Cath-
olic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the InfantJesus Church Elementary Sch., 696
A-2d 709 (NJ. 1997) (holding that the hybrid-rights test is valid when challenging a
facially neutral law); State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1996) (recognizing the
potential application of the hybrid-rights test).
123 Vandiver, 925 F.2d at 932.
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burden other constitutionally protected rights.1 2 4 In this case, how-
ever, the court did not find it necessary to do a hybrid analysis because
nothing in "Kentucky's statute or any action of the defendants inter-
fered with Brian's right to pursue a religious education in the
home."1 25 The court explained that "Brian's alleged interest is in
minimizing the burdens of test-taking, not in religious education....
[N] o special constitutional protections have been recognized for
those who feel burdened by testing.1 26
The hybrid-rights test raises many interesting questions, not the
least of which is why does the court require an add-on right with reli-
gious rights in order to get a compelling interest analysis? Or, is it
that a free exercise right no longer exists when faced with a neutral,
generally acceptable law? If so, one must question the wisdom of hy-
brid-rights analysis. If there is no valid free exercise right, then the
legal analysis would be more straight forward (and honest) to simply
focus on the "other" right and ignore the free exercise right
altogether.
This observation is not without academic support in recent schol-
arship. Consider the following opinion in a recent student note ex-
amining the impact of hybrid rights analyses in the lower courts:
"Analysis of hybrid claims in the lower courts leads to the unmistaka-
ble conclusion that the hybrid 'calculus'. . . simply is not being ap-
plied. Instead, these cases are being decided based solely upon the
strength or weakness of the 'other' constitutional provision without
reference to the Free Exercise Clause."' 27 Justice Souter came to a
similar conclusion when he observed, regarding a hybrid-rights claim,
that if this "claim is one in which the litigant would actually obtain an
exemption from a formally neutral, generally applicable law under an-
other constitutional provision, then there would have been no reason
for the Court, in what Smith calls the hybrid cases, to have mentioned
the Free Exercise Clause at all."1 28
While a critique of the Smith decision is beyond the scope of this
Note, 29 a brief observation seems appropriate. If the goal of the
124 Id. at 932-33.
125 Id. at 933.
126 Id.
127 William L. Esser, IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus
or Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 211, 242. (1998).
128 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
129 For a critique of Smith, see Kenneth Main, Note, Employment Division v.
Smith: The Supreme Court Alters the State of Free Exercise Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1431
(1991), and Rashelle Perry, Note, Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
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Smith court was to eliminate the compelling interest test because of
perceptions that the test could be, and probably was, applied in an
unprincipled fashion, then similarly-minded lower court judges can
use the Smith holding to do just that. However, since the Smith court
left the door open for strict scrutiny based on a hybrid analysis, some
judges may be motivated to find hybrid-rights in order to invoke a
compelling interest analysis. In the end, one is left wondering
whether the Smith decision clarified or further confused free exercise
analysis.
Further, if the criticisms of Justice Souter and commentator Wil-
liam Esser are correct, then two questions remain unanswered. First,
why do courts still employ a hybrid-rights test? And second, what
about Peterson? To answer the first question, one need only reflect on
the opinion that hybrid-rights analyses are often performed because
of strong emotional opinions regarding religious rights in general.
Whether one either supports or opposes religious rights, the fact re-
mains that our American psyche has been conditioned to accept that
religious rights are somehow different from, and some may even ar-
gue superior to, other rights. As a testimony to this high regard of
religious rights, consider what the Yoder court had to say about the
protection of religious rights compared to philosophical beliefs.
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be inter-
posed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is
based on purely secular considerations .... Thus, if the Amish
asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and re-
jection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority,
much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time .... their
claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was
philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief
does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.' 30
For whatever reason, religious values are treated differently.
The second question brings us to the heart of this Comment.
The Peterson court recognized the undeniable existence of a valid free
exercise right for Peterson to direct the religious training of his chil-
dren. While it is true that the Ninth Circuit did employ a compelling
interest test (and failed to refer to either the Smith decision or to hy-
brid-rights), the court did, nevertheless, employ a hybrid-rights
analysis.
sources v. Smith: A Halludnogenic Treatment of the Free Exercise Clause, 17J. CoNrEup. L.
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To prove this last point, one only has to consider the significant
amount of space the court devoted to Peterson's free exercise rights
and to his parental rights. The concurring opinion summed up this
analysis when it noted that the district court had to balance "Peter-
son's right to free exercise of his religion and to control the education
of his children" against the school district's need for effective lead-
ers.13 1 Thus, the Peterson court performed a compelling interest analy-
sis because it, implicitly, felt constrained by Peterson's hybrid rights of
the free exercise of his religion and his constitutionally protected pa-
rental right to direct the education of his children. Consequently, the
Peterson court validated the hybrid-rights exception propounded by
the Smith court.
Of course, such a conclusion does not, necessarily, invalidate the
criticisms of either Justice Souter or Mr. Esser. It would appear that
both of them are concerned with what some perceive as the declining
importance of free exercise rights. However, Peterson is, potentially, a
model for strengthening those very rights. Rather than deny the valid-
ity of a claimant's free exercise right, as was done in Cornerstone Bible
Church, Peterson demonstrates that a court can embrace a healthy free
exercise claim, combine it with another claim, and preserve the cause
of action.
Admittedly, this approach is not the same as recognizing a stand
alone free exercise right. And ultimately, it may be for the legislature
to devise a permanent solution to the Smith problem. However, hy-
brid-rights may be the best our current jurisprudence can muster.
Recently, Professor Ira Lupu observed-rather sardonically-that
hybrid-rights are
claims . . . based upon the conjunction of free exercise and other
constitutionally significant rights, like free speech or parental con-
trol over the rearing of children. ... [A] great many free exercise
claims might be recast to take advantage of this construct ...
[F]ree exercise claims frequently involve expression, association, or
parental concern for the religious upbringing of their children.
The last of these, of course, is the most important; it is the founda-
tion of Wisconsin v. Yoder, and because it depends upon the judge-
made right of parental control as a boost to the textual right of free
exercise, it is the most controversial member of the hybrid rights
set.... Creative lawyering might thus preserve the force of many
potential claims. At the very least, pressing hybrid claims wherever
plausible will presumably result in either an explanation and reaffir-
mation of "free exercise plus," or an ultimate admission by the
131 Peterson, 118 F.3d at 1361 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
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Court that the theory was no more than an unprincipled attempt to
pretend that Yoder survived Smith.I3 2
Following Lupu's reasoning, Peterson (and other cases like it) may
turn out to be nothing more than the proverbial "last straw" forcing
the Court to enunciate a more principled free exercise analysis. On
the other hand, Peterson may be an answer to the criticism of Mr. Esser
and Justice Souter. It is quite likely that Peterson provides a model for
courts sympathetic to upholding free exercise claims.
V. CONCLUSION: PETERSON AND TBE FUTURE
This Comment attempts to do three things. First, it gives the
reader a brief historical overview of the home school movement. Sec-
ond, it provides an introduction to home school free exercise claims
and to the contributions of the Peterson court. Third, it examines the
compelling interest test and how this test has changed since Smith was
decided. The final question to be addressed is, '"What does the Peter-
son decision mean for future home school free exercise claims?" At a
minimum it means that parents' rights to direct their children's edu-
cation will continue to be recognized as constitutionally protected.
More importantly, this case reinforces the established trend that free
exercise claims, including home school claims, begin with an individ-
ual's sincerely held religious belief; the sincerity (or lack thereof) is
measured by the individual's belief, regardless of corporate support.
That Peterson stands for the proposition that religious rights are to
be measured by the individual's faith alone has already received rec-
ognition in the academic community. Professor Rosemary Salomone
stated that Peterson stands for the fact that the "First Amendment's
guarantee of free exercise of religion protects acts rooted in religious
beliefs as perceived by the 'believers' and is not limited to require-
ments mandated by a church."'13 3
Whether Peterson will have any effect on the rights of parents to
opt-in to public education is yet to be determined. That parents even
want this choice may surprise some. Since many parents have re-
moved their children from public school over religious issues, it is un-
derstandable that school officials may be confused over the move by
some parents to bring their children back. However, some parents
want their children to have access to the public school system. Yet,
132 Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-
Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REv. 259, 266-67 (1993).
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these same parents are not interested in turning over the reigns of
control.
Parents want, and like, the freedom of home school and the ben-
efits of public school.134 However, as observed in the Swanson case,
schools are not always open to this idea. Whether the ultimate solu-
tion to this problem will come through the courts or by way of the
legislature is not certain. Yet, if ajudicial exception is inevitable, Peter-
son provides a working model for a solution to this dilemma.
The outer limits of the Peterson decision are yet to be seen. In the
end, the Peterson case may prove to be just one more attempt to wres-
tie with what many consider a rather disingenuous Smith court analy-
sis. It is encouraging, however, that Peterson-while admittedly a Smith
hybrid analysis-nevertheless performed that analysis "pro" free exer-
cise. Until either the Court or Congress can come up with a better
way to support free exercise rights, Peterson provides home school ad-
vocates with some hope of continuing freedom.
134 See Ralph D. Mawdsley, Parental Rights and Home Schooling: Current Home School
Litigation, 135 W. EDUC. L. REP. 313, 322 (1999).
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